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PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS – IS THERE A BETTER WAY?

by

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Preface

For the better part of two decades the United States Armed Forces have been engaged in the fight to help rid our country of the poison we know as illegal narcotics. We have employed a vast array of systems and thousands of our men and women in an effort to stem the flow of this evil that drains our nation. As a country we have attacked the problem from numerous angles using every instrument of power at our disposal. This paper is written in an effort to make some sense out of what we as a military have accomplished and where we should be headed in the future.

I chose this topic because I have been directly involved in the counter-narcotic efforts of the Air Force since 1985. This paper is an attempt to give credit to the aforementioned men and women that have served with me in some pretty arcane places on this globe. More importantly it is my desire to shed light on some serious misconceptions about what the military ought to be involved in concerning this valiant effort. I hope to inspire some independent thought on the part of you the reader and reaffirm in my own mind why we are so heavily involved in this endeavor.

Abstract

The United States will spend over \$1 billion in FY99 in an effort to combat the illegal flow of drugs into our country. That's money directly attributed to efforts overseen by the Office for National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and does not include the monies spent by local and state agencies throughout the country. It can be argued that as a nation we have attempted several different approaches including diplomatic, economic and informational avenues as we try to deal with Caribbean and Central and South American governments.

However, we seem determined on expanding military roles in the region. During the past two decades the administrations in power have continued to escalate the military's involvement in this fight. Our military's presence is so entrenched and permanent that it has become fashionable to refer to the entire process as the "war on drugs".

This paper will examine the primary instruments of power the United States has applied to the problem in the past and present. It will examine the emphasis placed on the problem from the perspective of our national and military leadership. The research will reveal our country's past involvement in the region referring to several instruments of power. Then it will look at the military's involvement historically and how that role is continually expanding. The research will then consider if any of the military applications are having the desired effect and then provide some alternatives for consideration.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Where do we begin?

In the past ten years we have seen changes in the geopolitical and geoeconomic arenas that would have been unfathomable a decade ago. The above statement could never be more accurate of our policy decisions surrounding the war on drugs. Given the enormity of the economic impact, number of nations involved in this effort and complexity of our national and military interests; we must ask ourselves if we are really waging a war on drugs. Or are we waging prohibition with widespread military application? More importantly, we must decide if our increasing use of the military instrument of power is adversely affecting that precarious balance between civil and military matters. A balance so important that our elected leaders fervently guarded it when they invoked the laws encompassed in the *Posse Comitatus Act*. Are we effectively utilizing our military assets to win a war? Are there more productive ways to achieve our national goal of reducing the drug flow into our country without impacting our military's readiness? Our leaders should have well framed answers to these questions.

This paper will show that the high cost of military operations in relation to percentage of contraband confiscated, increase in operations tempo, and enormous profit still enjoyed by the cartels in spite of our efforts is ridiculously lopsided. It will illustrate that there is a myriad of other options available that may be more efficient and do not threaten *Posse Comitatus*. Finally,

it will recommend that there are better avenues to attack this problem and make some recommendations based on the research.

Can We Win the War?

Unequivocally yes! In and of itself the United States has the military might to truly wage a lethal war on drugs if we chose to do so. If we identify the drug cartel's centers of gravity to include leadership, political supporters, supply, production facilities, transportation mediums and source of origination, we could effectively decimate the international drug trade. The casualties to the cartel would number in the thousands, a fraction of the mortality rate drugs cause in this country alone.

We have the intelligence mechanisms to expose the drug cartel's weak points and decimate their organizations. We can intercept radio and telephone conversations and exploit their limited secure communications capability. We have airborne and space based assets capable of pinpoint surveillance to target crops, production labs, modes of transportation, and even the movements of selected individuals. We have precision guided munitions capable of wholesale destruction of targeted facilities while greatly reducing collateral damage to innocent non-combatants. Our special operations forces are more than capable of targeting and incapacitating the cartel leadership. We have a substantial number of light infantry and ground forces capable of conducting counterdrug operations.

If the United States wishes to act unilaterally, without regard to world opinion, and with the brutal force associated with war, we could annihilate drug trafficking. There is little doubt in my mind (or most other military or civilian planners that I have served with) that this is true. They also point out that our elected leaders couldn't bear the political and media pressure in the aftermath of full-scale operations. General Stephen Olmstead worded his opinion to all out

military involvement very succinctly stating “we would use machine guns and not worry about Miranda rights”.¹ If the past two decades is any indicator our nation has not and will not ever unleash this awesome arsenal as just described. Instead we will continue to attack the problem piecemeal as we currently do and settle for ineffective and inefficient results!

Limitations

Due to the various collection assets, sensitive nature of some operations, and the security measures surrounding troop and unit movements, composition, and locations; some of the information contained in this paper will be general in nature. It will not effect the thrust or magnitude of the paper or foster any misconceptions for the reader. As a participant in numerous hours of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) surveillance missions, a commander at several radar sites, and an action officer at what is now Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) East; I feel qualified to interject my experiences into this discussion. However, there are disclosure agreements that I have been sworn to maintain precluding me from divulging certain specifics concerning operations or systems capabilities.

The methodology of the research is only limited by the timeliness of information discovered during the course of conducting the research and the time and energies of the author! Various venues including books, articles, web pages, lectures, and personal interviews were used to help provide a wide array of material to compose this research paper. Having acknowledged these limitations, the paper should still provide the reader with a comprehensive perspective of the United States’ history in the region both politically and militarily concerning the war on drugs and provide some alternatives to our current methodology in combating this problem.

Chapter 2

Current National Policies

Policymakers will have to determine that fine balance of when to avoid direct involvement in a crisis, when to act in concert with our allies, and when our interests mandate that we act alone. That, in turn, will require our tailoring our policies to fit the unique circumstances of regional contingencies.

- The Honorable Sam Nunn
United States Senator

There are a variety of methods that administrations and leaders in our country have used in promulgating drug policy throughout the years. We will examine several policy documents to help form an opinion on how well our civil and military leadership conveys their intentions for the continuing problem concerning drugs. These documents will provide a cornerstone for the viewpoints built in this section of the research paper. Our current national strategy suggests a multi-faceted approach to dealing with this scourge. However there seems to be a general lack of unity in effort regarding centralized planning when you examine the supporting documentation

National Security Strategy

In May 1997 the Clinton administration published “A National Security Strategy For A New Century” outlining our national interests and objectives. The national security strategy specifically addresses U.S. interests as vital, important, or humanitarian by categories. Additionally, this document outlines the three primary goals of the current administration as

promotion of democratic processes, economic prosperity, and enhancing national security using all the instruments of power the U.S. has at its disposal. Specifically, it states, “we must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. Secondly, we must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert global leadership and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests.”² Two key points in this excerpt are the reference to all instruments of power and the inclusion of non-state actors involved in or affecting our national interests. It is apparent that the President and his advisors are willing to exercise all our nations IOPs in the pursuit of our national goals.

Within the National Security Strategy (NSS) the President provides rather loose guidance for the military concerning our activities involving drugs. It says, “...law enforcement officials, military personnel and others are called upon to respond to assorted transnational threats that have moved center stage with the Cold War’s end”.³ This same indirect reference to military intervention in countering illegal drug operations is found in the segment that identifies U.S. intentions abroad. The NSS states, “the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy seeks to reduce cultivation of drug producing crops, interdict the flow of drugs at the source and in the transit zone (particularly in Central and South America, the Caribbean and Mexico), and stop drugs from entering our country.”⁴

It seems incredible that there is so little specific guidance for military involvement in the NSS. There are thousands of military men and women and hundreds of planes, ships, aerostats, radar sites, ground forces, and space assets tasked against this national interest. What is even more astounding is that from these scant directives the military has built at least three joint task forces and encumbered three combatant commanders with the arduous responsibility of bringing

all these missions together. In an attempt to bring some synergy to our efforts over the last decade an oversight agency has been created and tasked with tying all our initiatives together.

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)

The current “czar” of the ONDCP is the past commander of US Southern Command U.S. Army retired General Barry McCaffery. He brings a distinguished military career and firsthand knowledge of the area of responsibility to the agency. He is a man of enormous energy and a drive to succeed. To his credit he has outlined a comprehensive set of objectives that are extremely far reaching in trying to reduce our nation’s drug problems. They are all encompassing in their scope and treatment of the problems associated with narcotics.

ONDCP published the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy containing five goals and thirty-two objectives that attempt to focus our national effort. The five goals are:

1. Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs.
2. Increase safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug related crime.
3. Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drugs.
4. Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.⁵

Additionally, the thirty-two objectives contain some very specific guidance concerning the use of the military and our role in the strategy. It provides more specific tasks to each of the JIATF commanders, addresses interdiction efforts such as Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) in the Caribbean, and identifies key points in the 1997 changes to the Unified Command Plan.⁶ Some of the key objectives will be further examined during the military operations discussion.

Even with the umbrella oversight that General McCaffery interjects at ONDCP over a vast array of civil law enforcement and social service agencies; he cannot accomplish our goals without significant military assistance. In good faith the administration may dictate that all these

agencies cooperate; however, our country is securely anchored in its bureaucracy. The parochial bureaucratic nature of all the competing agencies, the military included, will never relinquish total control of their operations to another government agency. Therefore, the military like every other government agency involved, has become adept at formulating metrics to legitimize operations and budgets of our forces entrenched in this endeavor.

We have deployed US forces in numerous countries with little more than broad politically phrased guidelines in place for decades. The demise of the former Soviet Union has left the military with a void. With no clear-cut adversary the national command authority seems ever willing to employ the military in operations other than war. This is the case with the military application in the war on drugs. We have a significant military involvement with little long-term vision from our civil or military leadership.

National Military Strategy

General Shalikashvili in concert with the service chiefs and combat commanders formulated the National Military Strategy (NMS) in 1997 titled Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era. In this 30-page policy document is the framework for where, when, and how the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) sees our military forces applied in achieving our national goals. Unfortunately, it like the NSS is alarmingly short on detail concerning counterdrug activities. In the entire document there are roughly seven sentences to provide commanders with any insight. The best it can do is describe, “illegal drug trafficking, at home or abroad may exceed the capacity of other agencies and require the use of military forces, depending upon applicable law, the direction of the NCA, and the national interest involved”.⁷

The only other significant wording in the document concerning our efforts in the “drug war” is found under the dubious category of human emergencies other than armed conflict! Here

again it merely strings together a list of nasty events, drug trafficking being one of them, and then states that they all have the potential to interfere with U.S. interests. This is not exactly overwhelming support for our on-going operations. This is especially disconcerting given that the U.S. military has had forces engaged in this activity openly for more than fifteen years. Let's examine one more policy document that reflects the CJCS' expectations for the future.

Joint Vision 2010

"Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting".⁸ The entire document outlines the importance of our military readiness and ability to work jointly. Furthermore, it discusses the need for technological superiority, personnel training, and the total spectrum of military applications. However, again we find a surprising lack of attention to counterdrug operations that affect all services.

Joint Vision 2010 acknowledges these operations in the description concerning full spectrum dominance. It states, "the tactical mobility required for dominant maneuver which enables our forces rapidly to move into position to overwhelm an enemy will also allow commanders to place forces in positions of control in counterdrug, counterterrorism, or peace-keeping operations".⁹ It's apparent that the primary concern here seems to be the logistics required to move our forces and equipment and very little with how we would employ our forces in drug eradication efforts. In the broadest sense the drug interdiction effort is categorized as an operation other than war and possibly as a small-scale contingency.

A high level U.S. Customs official explained, "When the American military first got involved in the anti-drug effort, many, though not all, of the brass thought they could prevail-like

they do in a typical war-in a year or so and get out.” “When they found the drug problem was intractable and not amenable to such a quick solution, they lost interest. The will of the military is no longer concentrated on the drug war”.¹⁰

I must confess that more times than I’d like to admit during my involvement in counterdrug related operations I ran into that attitude. Too many senior military leaders looked at counterdrug missions as one more task to add to OPSTEMPO and deplete men and resources needed to assure readiness for our real mission. Only for a short period after the end of the Cold War did any appreciable number of commander’s look at these operations with a purpose. Most of them were affiliated with theater air control squadrons, both active duty and Air National Guard and quickly realized there was money to be had for the taking to fill the void of decreasing DOD budgets. That’s not to say that these organizations haven’t done a tremendous job. On the contrary the people associated with these units have worked long and hard to fulfill their orders.

We’ve taken a look at the more recent documents that drive our counterdrug policies. We need to take a hard look at the target region and see how the U.S. policies and the changing strategic environment brought us to our current situation. We will examine next; past to present U.S. postures in the region and their effects on our efforts to achieve our national objectives. It is imperative that we understand a little of our vast history to better appreciate how it impacts our past, current, and future military operations.

Notes

¹ *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security*, edit Donald J. Mabry, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989; 82.

² The White House. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*, May 1997, n.p.; 2.

³ Ibid.,10.

⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁵ ONDCP. *Statement by McCaffery Director of ONDCP Before the Senate Committee*, n.p. on-line, Internet, 23 July 1997, available from <http://www.health.org/pubs/mcstate/5.htm>

⁶ Ibid.

Notes

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy*, 1997, n.p.; 8.

⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2010*, 1996, n.p.; 1.

⁹ Ibid.,26.

¹⁰ Vincent T. Bugliosi. *The Phoenix Solution, Getting Serious About Winning America's Drug War*(Beverly Hills, CA, Dove Books, 1996) 55.

Chapter 3

U.S. Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into our midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

—Marx and Engels 1848

Western Hemispheric Influence

The United States more than 150 years ago in the Monroe Doctrine made it fairly clear that the U.S. would not tolerate any wholesale interloping by other major powers in the hemisphere of the Americas to include the Caribbean. In 1947 we signed the Rio Pact in a combined security agreement with our southern neighbors. Since then the U.S. has entered into hundreds of economic, diplomatic, and security agreements throughout Latin America. Foremost in all these agreements was our intention to maintain a considerable sphere of influence over all these countries. In the past 50-60 years we have asserted our foreign policy in the region in many different guises. Over time the governments and peoples of this region have seen us as a great Goliath on a continuum that goes from much needed benefactor to meddlesome interloper. Our methods and levels of involvement for most of the past six decades have led to many of our current frustrations and problems.

Before the Cold War

“Since the early nineteenth century, the primary interest of the United States in Latin America has been to have a peaceful southern flank”.¹ During the past 60 years, numerous political instruments have been agreed to in pursuit of this objective. In the mid to late 1940s the U.S. lobbied and politically influenced western hemisphere countries to participate in and ratify the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) and the Organization of American States (OAS). These treaties were paramount to cementing our foundations for this safe southern flank we felt compelled to build.

These various treaties at the end of World War II were important, as much for maintaining the status quo of the previous 100 years, as it was a reflection of the new uneasiness with the Soviets. Various studies of U.S. policy over this time period demonstrate a rather uninspiring period in U.S. foreign relations.

According to political scientists Jordan, Taylor and Korb in their text, American National Policy and Process, the U.S. had five primary national interests in the region.² These five objectives guided U.S. policy leading up to the height of the Cold War years. First, was preserving the status quo in the region from challenges from both within and without. Second, was the continued use of and defense of the Panama Canal that is important both commercially and militarily. Third, was our nation’s need for a stable Caribbean due to its proximity to the continental U.S. and its important strategic location in sea lines of communications. Fourth, Latin America satisfied many of our imperialistic needs concerning cheap available resources such as oil and raw materials. A good portion of our resources during WWII originated out of Latin America. Additionally, it was an easily

exploitable, open, eager market for U.S. manufacturers with goods to sell. Fifth, it was a ripe territory for practicing our plans for world democratization.

For the most part, these years prior to the Korean War and the blossoming of the Cold War years were fairly lackluster in terms of U.S. intervention in the region. However, as the Cold War grew, so did the bi-polar problems associated with it and Latin America would not escape the ravages of this tumultuous period in history.

The Cold War Bi-Polar Era

Probably at no other time in our relations with Latin America was more attention given to it than during the Cold War era. “During the Cold War period Latin America had ridden a roller coaster in terms of U.S. attention and interest, a familiar pattern in U.S.-Latin American relations. At times U.S. policy had been intensely focused on the region as presidents worried about the vulnerability of the region to communist ideologies and Soviet influence”.³

Most of us are old enough to remember the Cuban missile crisis and our flirtation with a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets. We had incidents in the Dominican Republic and the Bay of Pigs in Cuba where the U.S. actually deployed troops or supported armed insurgency. There was the ill-fated Iran/Contra affair that once again demonstrated the lengths some of our leaders would stoop to in an effort to stem Soviet or communist expansion in the area. We spent the better part of two decades in efforts to extinguish the communist foothold in Central and South America.

During this period we used political, economic and military instruments in every conceivable means to sway the nations along our southern flank. It is interesting to note that during the Cold War years the U.S. principle posture in the region really didn't change from its earlier years. William Appleman Williams of the University of Wisconsin, a revisionist,

correctly viewed our Cold War era dealings with other countries. According to Williams, “American diplomacy has consistently adhered to the policy of the “open door” that is, to a policy of commercial, political, and cultural expansion which seeks to extend American influence into every corner of the earth. American statesman believed that American capitalism needed ever-expanding foreign markets in order to survive”.⁴

I tend to agree that aside from our lofty moral tones of democratic freedoms for the people most of our dealings with Latin America during this period still tend to be self-serving. It is this self-serving tendency that has caused us problems in this new post Cold War era. Specifically, concerning our endeavors in eradicating drugs many Latin Americans truly feel it is an American problem and we are abusing our position of strength as we coerce them into conducting operations inside their own countries.

Post Cold War Thoughts

While it can be argued that much of our strategy concerning the Latin countries is self-serving there are some positive points to examine. There have been some tremendous changes in the region that the U.S. did play a vital role in bringing about.

The most noteworthy outcome of our years fighting communist expansion can be seen in the transformation of Central and South American countries to some form of representative democratic government. The same can be said for the majority of the Caribbean states. We have seen widespread economic gains and open trade established in most of these countries. Civil authority is empowered over the military in most cases and there is a much greater stability in the area than compared to the period between 1960-1989. However, there are challenges in this new era that the U.S. can not afford to ignore if we want to continue to make ourselves the hemispheric leader.

“Over the past generation the countries of Latin America have begun diversifying their trade, investment, and security relationships globally, in order to reduce their dependence upon the United States”.⁵ Given our history in the region this is understandable. We must continue to work with these countries, such as Brazil and Venezuela, as they emerge from third world status or loose a viable trade partner and strategic ally.

Diplomatic Considerations

Probably the toughest diplomatic policy change the U.S. has had to deal with and reshape is the emergence of this vast region into several diverse areas of influence. The U.S. can no longer afford to blunder through its dealings with these countries in a lump sum attitude. What is enticing for Mexico is unappealing to Peru or Jamaica. Incentives that produce cooperation with Brazil may be too advanced for the developing nations of Haiti or Nicaragua. Just as the world has become multi-polar the U.S. must become extremely adept at building individual partnerships with a highly diverse set of individual partners. General agreements will no longer satisfy this region of states that is becoming much more astute at courting European, Asian, and African countries to further their national priorities. This is especially true concerning our affairs dealing with economic policies in the region.

Economic Ramifications in the Region

Even with some of the financial setbacks in Latin America in the past two decades there is still an almost unlimited potential for growth throughout the entire region. The U.S. has enjoyed an economic advantage in the Latin American region for more than a century. However, over time that position has changed as the region grows in economic importance. Everyday there are new pressures for trade competition from European and Asian companies trying to gain a

foothold in the area. “Resource rich Brazil has the tenth largest economy in the world and has become a major trading nation. Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner and will provide a market of some one hundred million people by the end of the century”.⁶ If the U.S. wishes to continue to enjoy a healthy economic relationship with these countries we must step away from practices of the past. In the past two decades the U.S. has made several notable ventures to maintain our economic predominance.

Mutually beneficial economic agreements such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are all trade agreements entered into by the U.S. to assure our position as a crucial trading partner with this growing economic region. As we rethink our diplomatic and economic courses of actions we must also reassess our military posture in the region. In light of our growing use of the military in drug interdiction efforts we face several competing objectives.

Military Considerations

The majority of military forces of nations in Latin America have been under increased pressure to change and mature over the past two decades. For the most part they need to continue efforts to modernize their force’s assets and practices as they strive to become more professional militaries under civil authority. They must continue to reform their military focus from ones that look at internal affairs to providing national security.

Numerous scholars have tried to identify the role the military should play in Latin America. It is important to reiterate that the U.S. has a less than sterling reputation in pursuit of our national interests and the security needs of the individual countries. Jordan, Taylor, and Korb in their book embrace four areas of indigenous military considerations in Latin America. In these considerations only one premise vaguely addresses military operations in drug interdiction.

“First, challenges to internal order persist, including guerilla warfare. Border disputes and conflicting territorial ambitions form a second set of military issues of importance in Latin America. The third basic military issue concerns globally oriented missions for which Latin militaries might prepare themselves. Acquisition of weapons and training is the fourth military issue”.⁷ Brazil and Argentina have now developed a considerable capability to produce weapons domestically and are expanding sales throughout the region. Only the first consideration suggests military operations by a nation possibly against its own people.

We have a long-standing law codified almost 150 years ago, *Posse Comitatus*, that precludes the military from exercising police powers against our own citizens. Why then do we persist with a foreign and national security policy that encourages, even demands at times, that Latin American countries utilize their militaries in counterdrug operations against their own citizens? The answer is simply because we have the economic and military power to impose our will and we can disguise our activities when necessary under the appearance of security assistance, training, or even humanitarian assistance.

Moving On

We as a nation need to have an “evil empire” to strike out at, take the moral high ground and identify our problem with in order to justify our military involvement in drug interdiction abroad. Over the past 15 years we have pursued a course of action that almost everyone involved with admits eliminates less than 10 percent of the illicit drugs entering our country. And until recently we tried very hard to convince the American public that we were making a difference. Remembering the national strategy, diplomatic, economic, and military influences concerning the U.S. and Latin American relationship we have just examined, we can now move on and look directly at the U.S. military’s interdiction efforts.

Notes

¹ Amos A. Jordan, Taylor and Korb. *American National Security Policy and Process*, 4th ed. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 444.

² Ibid., 447-449.

³ Ibid., 444.

⁴ Christopher Lasch. *Classic Readings of International Relations*, 1994, (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace and Company) 406.

⁵ Amos A. Jordan, Taylor and Korb. *American National Security Policy and Process*, 4th ed. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 460.

⁶ Ibid., 444.

⁷ Ibid., 466.

Chapter 4

Direct Military Intervention

Prohibition is an awful flop. We like it. It can't stop what it's meant to stop. We like it. It's left a trail of graft and slime. It don't prohibit worth a dime. It's filled our land with vice and crime. Nevertheless we're for it.

—“The Wickersham Report,” A 1931 POEM WHICH MOCKED THE FINDINGS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, A PANEL APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT HERBERT HOOVER TO STUDY OUR BAN ON ALCOHOL

The mechanisms the U.S. has chosen to interdict drugs, specifically military operations, from the beginning of 1986 until the present has been troublesome for most of our foreign partners. Writing on behalf of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), its chairman, Antigua-Barbuda Prime Minister Vere Bird Sr., wrote to President Ronald Reagan protesting “attempts to extend domestic United States authority into neighboring countries of the region without regard to the sovereignty and independent legal systems of those countries”.¹ However, to a nation they have all succumbed to our political will. Primarily due to the economic backlash they perceive for none cooperation. “The policy dilemma posed by the drug trade.... is that individually and collectively they cannot control the drug trade, but that U.S. controlled, anti-drug strategy for the region may impinge on national sovereignty”.² And impinge we have as we have based every branch of the military in the past fifteen years in various forms of interdiction and eradication in these countries. Let’s look at some specific operations and what they entail.

Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN)

The CBRN sites spread throughout the Caribbean in the late 1980s through about 1995 represented one of the most intense radar nets every configured. As the Chief of Radar Operations at JIATF East for several months this network was my daily responsibility. This network used both full-time Air Force and Air National Guard mobile tactical radar units positioned throughout the Caribbean to conduct surveillance and interception operations against drug trafficking aircraft. Additionally, five aerostats capable of both maritime and air surveillance were incorporated into the system. During its grandeur there were more than 17 radars and 1000 personnel deployed in the region on any given day. This extensive network blanketed the entire Northern Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico almost to the North shores of South America. This network represented annual operational costs in excess of \$200 million a year. The initial purchase and beddown cost for an aerostat alone is roughly \$10 million with an annual operating cost of \$4 million.

In addition to being temporarily assigned to JIATF East, I was also the Operations Officer for the 71st Air Control Squadron and was responsible for the beddown and operations at the CBRN radar in Jamaica from 1991 until 1993. Our operation was the cover story in the May 1993 edition of Airman magazine. We were famous because during our two-year tenure we had been credited with the interdiction of more than \$160 million worth of cocaine. It sounds good on paper and justifies \$200 million to operate a network. However, during the same timeframe “the Medellin Cartel in Columbia, for example, probably grosses between \$4 and \$6 billion annually in the cocaine trade...”.³ More importantly, it only represents a 15-25 percent confiscation of drugs that transited the area and still flowed into the U.S. in 1991-1993. During

CBRN operations that were largely Air Force and Air National Guard there was a collateral effort going on in the Caribbean that shared CBRN intelligence and radar cueing.

Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos (OPBAT)

OPBAT was actually started in 1982 but really saw its heyday when CBRN was in full swing. OPBAT employed a true interagency force of Army helicopters and Forward Air Control fixed wing aircraft, U.S. Coast Guard helicopters P-3s and Falcon jets, and DEA personnel to intercept and apprehend drug traffickers as they transited north of Cuba in the Grand Cay area predominantly. OPBAT forces were pre-deployed in four bases throughout the Bahamas. “OPBAT has been credited with securing hundreds of arrests and the seizure of thousands of tons of cocaine and marijuana, as well as hashish and other drugs. Indeed, it was considered so vital that that a multilateral treaty involving the Bahamas, Britain (for the Turks and Caicos islands) and the United States was signed in 1990, extending OPBAT...”⁴ OPBAT was truly a team effort and one of the few areas that the Army played an airborne role.

The CBRN has slowly been dismantled as we look for alternative systems and draw the mobile radar systems out of the islands and out of service. One system now being utilized was actually a casualty of the Cold War draw down that is seeing renewed life. It will provide a significant deterrent to the airborne operations used by drug traffickers.

Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR)

ROTHR was originally designed during the late 70s and early 80s to enhance our early warning systems for the continental United States. This NORAD asset was put into mothball status when the Berlin Wall fell. ROTHR is different from conventional radars because it bounces signals off the atmosphere to detect aircraft at amazing distances up to 2000 miles.

ROTHR currently consists of two sites in CONUS with a third site set for Puerto Rico; although there has been some opposition both domestically and abroad to the location of this site and sovereignty issues. Even without the third radar “ROTHR can sweep most of the Caribbean, Central America, and northern Columbia and Venezuela”.⁵ However, ROTHR isn’t cheap; initial cost for each facility is approximately \$12 million dollars with an annual budget in excess of \$12-\$14 million annually according to Pentagon sources. But when you discount per diem and housing costs to maintain a deployed force, I think ROTHR may become very attractive to the DOD. It can effectively counter the air threat and relieve forces to combat the maritime and overland traffic options.

Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET)

The 1989 National Defense Authorization Act designated the DOD as lead agency for all aerial and maritime surveillance of drug smugglers attempting to enter the U.S.. It also established the tasking to establish appropriate C4I architectures to accomplish the mission. Additionally it expanded the role of the Coast Guard to deploy a minimum of 500 law enforcement trained personnel on U.S. naval warships operating in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the Latin American region under the LEDET program. One very crucial point in the Authorization Act it indemnified any U.S. Navy ship commander from civil and criminal liability for firing on suspect vessels regardless of national registry!⁶ These LEDET teams had the authorization to board and search any vessel they felt was suspect. In one year “Under the LEDET program, the Navy spent \$27 million and the Coast Guard spent \$13 million to capture twenty boats carrying 225,000 pounds of marijuana and 550 pounds of cocaine (approximately \$2 million per seizure)”.⁷ The high cost of interdiction is only half as worrisome

as the continued stretching of the *Posse Comitatus* limitations originating in our constitutional philosophy. But as you can see every branch of the service is involved and in jeopardy.

Aerostats and the Air National Guard

One last example is necessary before we leave this portion of the discussion. In 1989 and into the early 90s Congress attempted to further tighten our borders and flirt with *Posse Comitatus*. We began building a domestic CBRN if you will along the border between the U.S. and Mexico. These are basically the same types of aerostat we deployed in the Caribbean. In addition, Congress funded monies to individual states for National Guard deployments along the border thereby sidestepping *Posse Comitatus* since National Guard unit's in-state work for the governor and are therefore exempt from the law! According to an article by M. Mungers in the periodical *Parameters*, "the National Guard currently has more counter-narcotics officers than the DEA has special agents on duty. Each day it is involved in 1,300 counterdrug operations and has 4,000 troops on duty".⁸ While this may sound like an incredible exaggeration there is no disputing the tremendous load the National Guard now carries in the national interdiction campaign on the domestic front. As the National Guard continues to absorb the CONUS defense mission this will become increasingly true. At March Air Reserve Base, California, Guard members help man the inter-agency drug operations center 24 hours a day.

United States Southern Command

Under the provisions of the 1996/97 UCP USSOUTHCOM now has the entire Latin American region under its purview. Up until this point its focus was the Central and South American nations with particular attention to Panama and the Andean Countries. USSOUTHCOM has conducted numerous interdiction and eradication programs over the past 15

years. Of greatest importance are the countries of Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. We have maintained both AWACS and mobile tactical radars in the area during this entire time. As the Chief of Radar Operations at HQ PACAF it was my duty to oversee the deployment schedule for AWACS crews to Panama. We have had crews on alert at Howard AFB in support of interdiction efforts around the clock for over 5 years. Additionally, we have operated mobile radar units in every country mentioned above with the exception of Venezuela.

We have concentrated around-the-clock surveillance in the Bolivian-Peru-Ecuador corridor as we monitor traffic bound for Columbia. We have built a vast intelligence model to benefit host nation authorities apprehend these traffickers. Unfortunately, in my opinion the end-game results regarding apprehension and prosecution in the countries of origin are thoroughly disappointing. As the site commander in Ecuador for three months I can honestly say I never received conformation of a single air or ground interdiction that culminated in an arrest in Columbia, Peru, or Bolivia. That's a lot of surveillance with zero feedback to provide the troops doing their job. In fairness to the Ecuadorian government; drugs use and trafficking are not a significant social or economic problem, and therefore, they are not in the same category as the countries mentioned above.

Everyone Plays

As the last few pages should have driven home, every single service has a piece in the interdiction puzzle. AWACS and jet fighters standing alert, Navy and Coast Guard vessels prowling the seas, National Guard and Marine ground forces patrolling our borders and manning radar sites, NORAD using the ROTH system; everyone is involved in this protracted effort. It is costing us a fiscal fortune not to mention training opportunities lost, readiness and increased

operations tempo aggravations, and severe distraction from the fundamental mission of our military – preparing and training to fight and win our countries wars.

There are parts of this effort that the military can continue to enhance; but we, as a nation should take a hard look at some of the alternatives. We have tread on the basic principles of posse comitatus and jeopardized our military's position. Worst yet we have placed the men and women of the services in undo legal jeopardy. This was painfully true with young Marine Corporal Clemente Manuel Banuelos who faced a court martial for his lawfully ordered involvement in a border incident last year.

As part of the increased use of the military to patrol our southern border this young Marine was ordered to a surveillance post along the Mexican border. He witnessed an individual crossing the border and killed the young man, Esequiel Hernandez Jr., when he saw muzzle flash fired from a rifle. He reacted in a manner consistent with his military training. Unfortunately, the person crossing the border was not involved in drug trafficking or illegal activities. He was just a young man in the wrong place at the wrong time. I will accept that a trained police officer may or may not have reacted differently. What is important here is the police officer would have had full jurisdiction and authority under the laws of our country. The military can still aid in the fight to lessen the impact of illegal drugs on our society while reducing our footprint and maintaining our constitutional integrity.

Interdiction has been the primary military application for more than 15 years. And after all this time we have not had a serious impact on the drug market if price and availability are an indicator. That stability in price is a profound indicator of our ineffectiveness in drying up drug supplies. "With or without the military, the logistical impediments to interdiction are insurmountable".⁹ In 1986 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger correctly stated:

You have to have a complete naval and air blockade to do this against anything on the sea or in the air that might be carrying narcotics. That is about 290,000 registered and 4,000 unregistered general aviation aircraft, plus a great many commercial aircraft. Without adequate intelligence, we wouldn't have any idea whether any of these planes were actually carrying narcotics. We would also have to have a continuous 4,000-mile naval blockade off the coastline. We'd have to be able to intercept 160,000 documented, registered vessels which arrive each day at the U.S. ports. In effect, you're ordering the *entire* military to do one nonmilitary task.¹⁰

Our whole approach to the military effort is analogous to the Vietnam War and our penchant for body counts as an indicator of success. The only difference in the "drug war" is we have swapped body bags for kilos, plants, planes, boats, and arrests! It is time to step back and look at some alternative methods to counter the drug industry.

Notes

¹ Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith. *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Seige* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 222.

² *Ibid.*, 222.

³ *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security*, edit Donald J. Mabry, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989; 45.

⁴ Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith. *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Seige* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 217.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁶ *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security*, edit Donald J. Mabry, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989; 85.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁸ M. Munger. *The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight*, 1997, Summer, n.p. on-line, Internet, 16 November 1998, available on <http://www.csdp.org/factbook/military.htm>

⁹ Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Gross. *America's Longest War Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade Against Drugs* (New York: Putnam Books, 1993) 204.

¹⁰ Vincent T. Bugliosi. *The Phoenix Solution, Getting Serious About Winning America's Drug War* (Beverly Hills, CA, Dove Books, 1996) 54.

Chapter 5

Alternative Courses of Action

Americans exist in a kind of time-vacuum: we have no public memory of anything that happened before last Tuesday.

—Gore Vidal

Mr. Vidal couldn't be more accurate if he had personally extolled those words on our nation's military involvement in the drug war. Year after year we have pursued the same operations with little change in our methods or in the end result. We will now examine what three other notable individuals present as alternatives to the way our country has handled this problem that ravages our society.

Vincent T. Bugliosi

Mr. Bugliosi spent eight years as a prosecutor for the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office. He has written four best selling books and is a highly sought after lecturer. His alternative to our current policies may seem a little harsh or far-fetched but they do provide an intriguing backdrop for the other pundits we will discuss. In his book, *The Phoenix Solution*, he expresses four basic premises for fighting the war on drugs. It is a comprehensive plan that puts all four facets together to create a synergy of effect.

Military Search-and-Find Mission

“This proposal calls for the deployment of a U.S. Army Special Forces unit (or a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force) on Colombian soil for the specific and limited purpose of apprehending and bringing to the United States for criminal prosecution the drug kingpins who are responsible for the cocaine blitz of America”.¹ There are several advantages to this point of view from a military standpoint.

First, this type of mission is planned and practiced thoroughly prior to execution. It minimizes the number of troops in a foreign country attempting to enforce U.S. policy. Moreover, it reduces the number of troops in harms way. The mission is achievable and the intelligence and fiscal costs are insignificant compared to what we spend today. Even if you forward deploy a 30-man strike team for 30 days to accomplish the mission it won’t cost more than the cost of a 75-man radar unit sitting in country for 30 days figuring in logistic costs.

Secondly, this position takes the fight to the enemy. Instead of letting the drug cartel pick and choose routes, times and methods of transportation favorable to them we would engage them and use the element of surprise to our advantage. As war theorist like Clausewitz and Jomini have pointed out it is much more difficult to win a war from a defensive posture. Bugliosi seems to understand and embrace the idea of going on the offensive.

Thirdly, and possibly most importantly is the psychological effect that this type of operation will have on the cartels both present and those contemplating taking the place of those apprehended. After several drug lords were in prison the next in line might rethink his options.

Death Penalty

Bugliosi contends that this threat would make a crucial difference to those clamoring to replace those that have gone before them. He recommends, “new emergency legislation providing for

the death penalty for anyone, not just foreign drug lords, but American traffickers who, within a one year period, exports or imports drugs into, or sells or distributes drugs, in this country with a street value in excess of some figure, such as \$5 million”.² It is important to note that he does not require a killing to have occurred, as most states deem necessary, to carry out this penalty. In 1994 under the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act drug lords now face the death penalty but only if they have received in excess of \$20 million in one year.

Special Courts

The third leg of *The Phoenix Solution* is the institution of a special court to hear drug cases. In the author’s opinion this would free up other courts mired down in excessive drug cases and speed to conviction the guilty. He does not advocate any change in defendant’s right to counsel or appeal. Bugliosi states “Under the special federal court apparatus contemplated, drug lords could be tried and, if the evidence was there, convicted and have their probable sentence of death carried out within a matter of one or at most two years, as opposed to the incredibly long, drawn-out process now in place, which sentences of death are normally imposed from ten and fifteen years after being meted out”.³

Money Laundering

The Bank Secrecy Act was enacted in part to curb the flood of money that could go unreported and sent into the trafficker’s pockets. Unfortunately, the law was fairly good but the adherence and reporting was abysmal. The Money Laundering Control Act, the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, and the Money Laundering Suppression Act, all help tighten up areas within the Bank Secrecy Act. However, all the laws in the world won’t enforce compliance. Bugliosi identifies one special office that has the expertise to hammer the drug lords. There is a little known and understaffed section of the IRS known as the Criminal

Investigation Division.⁴ They are all highly skilled in the ways financial transactions can be altered or hidden in an attempt to circumvent the law. Unfortunately they only have about 400 agents to work money laundering. Bugliosi would increase their manning and give them the assets necessary to make a severe dent in the funds being wire transferred or carried out of the country in hard currency to the drug lords.

While military kidnappings, death penalties and special courts may sound rash and an army of accountants invading your local bank a bit unnerving, his viewpoint is not outrageous. Taken together to provide mass and energy of effort the combined weight of these measures could very well send the drug business into a downward spiral. Next we will look at a somewhat more conservative author's approach.

Donald J. Mabry

Professor Donald J. Mabry is a Senior Fellow of the Center for International Security and Strategic Studies, Mississippi State University. He has written a number of items concerning security and was the editor for one of the principal research documents used in this research. His opinion of the ways our nation should address the drug problem is quite different from those of Vincent Bugliosi.

In the book, *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security* Professor Mabry suggests 10 policy directives to attack the problem of drugs in our society. His statistics and viewpoints have already been illuminated in several portions of this research. Here is the list that Professor Mabry has conceived:

1. The U.S. Customs Service should be lead agency in the anti-smuggling campaign, with the Coast Guard serving as one enforcement arm.
2. The Coast Guard and Customs should be given increased funding so they can use their own personnel and equipment to interdict smuggling of any kind at the borders and at sea.

3. The military's mission as the nation's defense against foreign armies and against domestic insurrection should be reaffirmed. The military should fight real wars, not pseudo-wars such as the war on the so-called "war on drugs".
4. In order to protect constitutional government and civil liberties, the military should not be given civilian police powers. Congress and the Executive branch should ensure that its laws do not impair civil liberties, including the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing the accused the right to face their accusers, whether the accusers are civilian or military.
5. If the military is to be involved, it should be restricted to giving logistical support (loans of specialized equipment, communications support, appropriate intelligence information, and specialized training) to civilian law enforcement agencies, and they should be funded appropriately.
6. Congress and the Executive Branch should make it clear to the American public that interdiction is no more than a holding action, and that the drug problem will be solved only when Americans decide to quit using illicit drugs. Put another way, expectations that interdiction is a solution should be lowered as quickly as possible.
7. Congress and the Executive branch should make it clear that the United States has no intention of violating the sovereignty of other nations.
8. Congress and the Executive branch should make it clear that the U.S. military will not be used to eradicate or to help eradicate crops in other nations.
9. State governors, with the aid of DOD, should explore possibilities of using their National Guard units to supplement the work of state and local law enforcement.
10. The United States needs to develop better means of border interdiction of all smuggled goods, not just illicit narcotics. Inability to enforce the national importation laws is a more general problem adversely affecting the nation's security and economic well-being.⁵

For the most part Professor Mabry presents a slightly more socially accepted and domestically anchored agenda in his presentation. His willingness to make the Congress and the Executive branch responsible for leading our nation out of this rancorous mess is right on target. They are the ones with the political means and the financial purse strings.

I thoroughly agree with Professor Mabry's appointment of the Coast Guard and Customs Departments as the lead agencies in this fight if for no other reason than the implications concerning *posse comitatus* and their exemption from the provisions of this law. I also agree with him that the mainstream military should be in a supportive role. That is where we have a difference of opinion concerning the National Guard. While he is quite correct that the National Guard is a state agency unless federalized they still wear the same uniform as the U.S. Army. They are a critical link in the nation's total force and counterdrug missions hurt their readiness

and training as much or more than it does the active forces. His points concerning sovereignty and eradication play well to our southern neighbors but I think they are a little naïve. Overall his policies are not remarkably different from many other scholars who have tried to find an answer to this meddlesome problem.

General Barry McCaffery

General Barry McCaffery (U.S. Army retired) is a highly energetic, in your face administrator with vast first hand knowledge of the military's drug interdiction effort. In his 1997 testimony before Congress and in a subsequent interview he proposed several key changes to the national strategy.⁶ The following ones expressly affect the military directly or indirectly.

Preventing Drug Trafficking across the Southwest Border

General McCaffrey is committed to reinforcing civil law enforcement agencies in this area. Specifically, he wants 192 additional DEA agents, 500 more Border Patrol agents, 69 additional FBI field agents, and 119 additional Customs cargo inspectors. This dramatic increase in civilian law enforcement places police powers in the right sector.

He also wants to close the Caribbean avenues of transportation with better intelligence estimates and sharing and a regionalization of the OPBAT operation. The intelligence and OPBAT support squarely keep a considerable military presence involved in the interdiction business. He has managed to get full cooperation from DOD and the CJCS even to the point of gaining reorganization and tasking of the unified commands area of responsibilities and duties in the UCP for USSOUTHCOM and USACOM.

He still desires the heavy use of AWACS and U.S. Navy and Customs aircraft to try and maintain a radar intercept capability. He also advocates the purchase of more sophisticated X-ray machines with larger capacities to scan like one now operating on the Mexican border.

Overall his stated goal is to reduce drug use in America to the levels seen in the 1960s! That is an incredible outlook on a campaign called a war! Sooner or later the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders are bound to chaff at the competition for valuable assets like the AWACS and theater air control systems being taken from them to support the drug effort.

Notes

¹ Vincent T. Bugliosi. *The Phoenix Solution, Getting Serious About Winning America's Drug War* (Beverly Hills, CA, Dove Books, 1996) 79.

² Ibid., 162.

³ Ibid., 164.

⁴ Ibid., 196.

⁵ *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security*, edit Donald J. Mabry, Greenwood Press, New York, 1989; 87-88.

⁶ Gen Barry McCaffrey. *Global Cooperation Vital in Addressing Drug Concerns*, n.p. online, Internet, July 1996, available from <http://www.usia.gov/journals/itgic/0796/ijge/ejfocl.htm>

Chapter 6

Conclusions

We continue to pursue a policy that does not and cannot work.

—MATHEA FALCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS 1977 TO 1981

We have examined numerous facets concerning the problems that the illegal trade of narcotics has on the United States. Specifically we have looked at the political, economic and military instruments of power and how our national leaders have or have not used them in these efforts to rid our country of this dreaded social parasite.

The research attempted to show some of the historical climate that the United States has established with our Latin neighbors. Many of the problems to be overcome are still shadowed by the distrust for America ingrained many generations ago throughout the countries we so desperately need cooperation from today. This paper has attempted to explain how these political repercussions continue to hamper our military efforts and make our motives suspect to most of the Andean and Caribbean nations.

Several military interdiction methods were examined and the successes discussed. The cost of these operations in personnel, equipment and readiness in comparison to the percentage of drugs interdicted was analyzed. We looked at three experts differing opinions concerning the direction our country should be taking to stem the tide of this vicious killer and economic scab. All three had widely varying opinions concerning the military role in combating this epidemic.

Recommendations

In my opinion the military interdiction effort is an extremely expensive and ineffective mission for our forces to perform. I wholeheartedly support the premise that the military should be in a support role. I believe a civil law enforcement agency given the necessary funding, manning and equipment to make a difference should guide the bulk of operations. Bugliosi has the right idea that the U.S. Customs Department should be the lead agency with U.S. Coast Guard in a direct support role. I would significantly expand personnel in both these agencies to perform this mission. The use of deployed military search and surveillance missions and equipment, especially AWACS and mobile ground radar units, should be decreased dramatically and reconfigured for domestic operations along our Gulf coast and the Mexican border.

I think Mr. Bugliosi is on track concerning death penalties and special courts. I do not want to appear quick to condemn but the current punishments do not deter the drug kingpins. Our prisons are too porous and allow these individuals the power to manipulate the system from within while they continue to conduct business as usual.

Stopping the flow of profits to these drug lords may be the most effective and least dangerous method to our civil and military personnel. If the drug lords and their cohorts can no longer amass great wealth the allure of the drug trade will diminish. Take the profit out of their pockets and employ the people they exploit in meaningful business ventures. I strongly advocate the expansion of the IRS banking division to enforce our current laws. Additionally, I would use the incentive of withdrawal of our most favored trading status to persuade foreign powers to cooperate. We must not tolerate looking the other way by other governments when it deals with drug money laundering activities.

Lastly, I recognize that in this changing world the U.S. military will be increasingly called upon to conduct non-traditional missions in support of U.S. interests. However, caution must be exercised so that we do not saturate the military with so many contingencies that we no longer have a lethal fighting force. Militarily we can stop the bad guys cold if that is the true national security objective. Until we are ready to do just that, get the military out of the drug forefront and let us get back to what we do best – ensure we can win our nations military wars!

Glossary

AFB	Air Force Base
ACS	Air Control Squadron
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CBRN	Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
C4I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
EAI	Enterprise for the Americas
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
HQ PACAF	Headquarters Pacific Air Forces
IOP	Instrument of Power
JIATF	Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
LEDET	Law Enforcement Detachment
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NCA	National Command Authority
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Air Defense
OAS	Organization of American States
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPBAT	Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos
OPSTEMPO	Operations Tempo
ROTHR	Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar

UCP
USACOM
USSOUTHCOM

Unified Campaign Plan
United States Atlantic Command
United States Southern Command

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